Unlike other data sets, recent interviews from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth obtain information on who bears the explicit costs of training. The data indicate that the employer almost always pays the explicit cost of training that the worker receives on the employer's premises and often pays for the explicit costs of what appears to be off site general training. Furthermore, our wage regressions indicate that completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger effect on the wage than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer. While these results are contrary to the conventional human capital model, we present a model that demonstrates how contract enforcement considerations can lead to employers paying for purely general training. An employer in our model offers a future wage guarantee in order to provide an assurance that he will not extract excessive rents from workers who demonstrate by not quitting that they place a relatively high valuation on the employer's job.
I. Introduction
In a seminal paper, Becker (1962) originally pointed out that the division of the costs and returns to training between an employer and a worker can have important effects on labor turnover. Hashimoto (1981) followed up Becker's discussion by formally determining the division of costs and returns that maximizes the expected value of an employer-worker match. Interestingly, the existing empirical evidence suggests that employers realize an inordinate share of the returns to training. For example, Barron, Berger, and Black (1993) , Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) and Bishop (1988) find that the impact of an hour of training on productivity growth is about five times as large as the effect on wage growth.
Given that employers seem to realize most of the returns to training, we would also expect that employers incur most of the costs. Workers can bear the costs of training either explicitly or indirectly in the form of a lower wage. Earlier researchers have not had information on workers' explicit training costs, and thus have limited their attention to workers' implicit costs during the training period. Their findings indicate that workers bear little, if any, of the costs of training in the form of a lower starting wage: see Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) , Barron, Berger, and Black (1993) , Lynch (1992) , and Parsons (1989) . Unlike other data sets, recent data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth have information on who bears the explicit costs of training. This paper looks at this new information. It also uses the new data to re-examine the relationship between wages and training, both during and after the training period.
Not surprisingly, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data indicate that the employer almost always pays the explicit cost of training that the worker receives on the employer's premises. Much more surprisingly, the employer often pays for the explicit costs of what appears to be general training: seminars or training programs outside of work and training that a worker receives in business school, an apprenticeship program, a vocational or technical institute, or a correspondence course. Furthermore, our wage regressions indicate that completed spells of this general training paid for by previous employers have a larger effect on the wage than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer. 1 These latter two observations are both at odds with the standard human capital model, which predicts that workers should pay for all the costs and realize all the returns to general training investments.
In the next section of this paper, we present a model that demonstrates how contract enforcement considerations can lead to employers paying for purely general training. Our model follows up on the initial suggestion by Kuhn (1994) and Black and Loewenstein (1995) that employers' inability to make certain long-term wage commitments may be important in determining how the costs of and returns to training are shared between them and their workers.
The key to our explanation as to why employers share the returns and costs to general training is the suggestion by Black and Loewenstein that a wage guarantee can be helpful in preventing employers from extracting excessive rents from workers who demonstrate by not quitting that they place a relatively high valuation on the employer's job. When this wage guarantee is binding, a small increase in a worker's productivity caused by an increase in his stock of human capital will not cause the employer to pay a higher wage. This sharing of the returns to general training makes the worker less willing to pay for the training alone but provides the employer with an incentive to share the cost.
Section three of the paper describes the new training information in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Section 4 then examines the evidence on the sharing of the costs and returns to training. Possible alternative explanations for our results are discussed in the concluding section.
II. A Simple Model of Rent Extraction
1 Using earlier NLSY data, Lynch also finds that off-the-job training acquired before current employment has a significant and positive effect on a worker's wage, but prior off-the-job training at the current employer does not. Lynch notes that her finding may reflect either the fact that young workers are acquiring the training in order to "move to another employer or career track or the ... sharing of the costs of training with the current employer through lower wages... (but) unfortunately, it is difficult to identify from the (earlier) NLSY data who is paying for the direct costs of off-the-job training." Consider a match between an employer and worker that begins in period 0. Suppose the employer and worker both have an infinite time horizon and discount factor β. The worker's value of marginal product in period t, P t , depends on T t , the total amount of training he has received in the past and on a random disturbance v t . 2 Specifically, letting T τ denote the training that the worker received in period τ, we have
We will assume that ψ' > 0 and ψ'' < 0; that is, past training raises the worker's current productivity, but there are diminishing returns.
As first pointed out by Johnson (1978) , workers differ in their valuation ε of the non-pecuniary attributes of the employer's job. We will treat ε as a random variable with density function g and cumulative distribution function G and we will let V t (ε) denote the value of the employer's job at time t to a worker whose realized non-pecuniary valuation is ε. Knowledge about ε is the private information of the worker, but the functions g and G are common knowledge.
Workers are able to engage in on the job search. Letting y t be a random variable denoting the value of an alternative job located at the beginning of period t, a worker with non-pecuniary valuation ε quits the employer's job if y t > V t (ε). Assuming that y t is distributed with density function f t and cumulative distribution function F t , the probability that the worker quits is simply (2) Q t (ε) = 1-F t (V t (ε)). Using Bellman's principle, the value of the employer's job to the worker at the beginning of period t is given by 2 The disturbance v t may reflect either a demand shock or the fact that the employer only learns about a worker's productivity over time.
where w t denotes the wage the employer offers at time t and k t denotes the (direct) cost to the worker of a unit of training.
Provided that training is not purely specific, the worker's past training raises his productivity elsewhere as well as at his current employer. More precisely, a worker's past training T t raises the value of an alternative job in period t by the amount αψ( T t ), where α is a parameter between 0 and 1 that represents the generality of the employer's training (note that α = 1 corresponds to purely general training and α = 0 corresponds to purely specific training). The density of y t is thus given by
where in the absence of training the value of an alternative job is distributed with density function f and cumulative distribution function F. In interpreting (4), note that past training shifts the worker's initial distribution of alternatives to the right by the amount αψ(T t ). Making use of (4), equation (3) can be rewritten as
From equations (2), (4), and (5), we obtain
That is, other things the same, the worker's quit probability in period t is inversely related to both his wage and his valuation of the non-pecuniary features of the employer's job and is positively related to the past training he has received.
While the employer is not able to directly observe the valuation ε that a worker places on the non-pecuniary attributes of the job, the fact that a worker has stayed with the employer through period t-1 provides the employer with information about ε. Letting g t (ε) denote the employer's updated posterior density of the worker's ε conditional on the worker's not quitting in period t -1, we have
It follows immediately from (6b) and (7a) that the greater a worker's tenure, the higher the probability that he has a high ε draw. To find the probability Q t that a worker who has stayed with the employer through period t-1 quits at the beginning of period t, we need only take the expectation of Q t (ε) over ε, or Q t = Q g d
The employer's profit depends on the worker's valuation of the non-pecuniary aspects of the employer's job because the higher is ε, the lower is the worker's quit probability. If the employer knew ε, then the employer's profit at the beginning of period t would be (8) π t (ε) = (1-Q t (ε))(P t -w t -c t T t + βπ t+1 (ε))
where c t denotes the cost to the employer of providing a unit of training during period t. As discussed above, the employer does not observe ε. The expected value to the employer of a worker at time t is thus the expectation of π t (ε), or
Two contracting assumptions are common in the literature. At one extreme, it is sometimes assumed that an employer can credibly commit to any future wage profile at time 0. This assumption is not very plausible, especially when one considers that it implicitly presumes that the employer can make future commitments on the basis of decisions that have not yet been made at the time he hires the worker. For example, a promise by the employer to raise a worker's wage by some specified amount if the worker invests in an extra unit of training in period t will be difficult to enforce if the training is not easily verifiable by a third party. In addition, the promise will create a serious incentive problem if, as seems likely, the value of the worker's training depends upon the effort he puts in during the training period. Of course, the employer could promise to increase the worker's future wage by the actual increase in his future productivity, but this promise is not readily verifiable.
Because an employer's commitment to condition future wages on variables, such as future productivity, that are not readily observed by outside parties will not be credible, it is sometimes assumed that an employer must offer a contract that he will not have an incentive to alter after the employment relationship has begun. In spite of this appealing motivation, the pure self-enforcing assumption is not completely satisfactory because it allows no wage commitments at all. While there are certainly restrictions on the commitments that employers can make, there does not seem to be anything preventing them from at least committing to some minimum guaranteed wage.
Rather than assume that an employer has either a perfect ability to commit or absolutely no ability to commit, it seems more reasonable to assume, as do Black and Loewenstein (1995) , that at the time of hire the employer guarantees some minimal wage in the future, but is free to offer a higher wage if he so desires. Let ω t be the minimal guaranteed wage that the employer promises at the time of hire to pay in period t. The employer's actual wage offer w t in period t maximizes π t subject to the constraint that (10) w t ≥ ω t .
Differentiating (9) with respect to w t , we see that the wage at time t that maximizes π t subject to the wage commitment (10) satisfies the first-order condition
where µ t is a non-negative Kuhn-Tucker multiplier that is equal to zero if the wage guarantee is not binding in period t (that is, µ t = 0 if w t > ω t ). For our subsequent analysis, it will be convenient to normalize by dividing both sides of (11) by 1-Q t . Doing so and rearranging terms using (7a) gives us
denotes the normalized quit responsiveness of a worker whose valuation of the non-pecuniary attributes of the employer's job is ε,
denotes the expected value of η t (ε), µ t ≡ µ t , and ϕ(x) denotes the hazard rate f(x)/F(x) which is assumed to be diminishing. 3 In interpreting (12), note that P t -c t T t is the worker's value of marginal product in period t net of the training costs that the employer incurs. If the wage guarantee is not binding in period t (so that µ t = 0) and if the employer does not to expect to earn any profits in future periods (so that η ε π ε ε ε
= 0), then we see from (12) that the employer's period t wage offer will be less than the worker's net marginal product and the employer will extract some of the current rents from the match. The less responsive is the normalized quit rate to a change in the wage (that is, the smaller is η t ), the lower the self-enforcing wage offer and the greater the share of rents that the employer extracts. If we now relax the assumption that future profits on retained workers are zero, then we see that the fact that the employer expects to earn positive profits on a retained worker in the future will temper his rent extraction today.
Differentiating (13a) yields
In other words, a worker's normalized quit responsiveness η t (ε) is inversely related to his valuation of the non-pecuniary features of the employer's job. Because equations (6a) and (7b) imply that workers with greater tenure are more likely to have a high ε draw (or, more formally, that there exists a critical value ε such that g t (ε) > (<) g t+1 (ε) as ε > (<) ε), it follows immediately that the greater is a worker's tenure t, the lower is his expected quit responsiveness η t . As discussed above, a falling η t provides the employer with an incentive to reduce his wage offer over time.
Thus, if training and productivity growth are not sufficiently high, the self-enforcing wage will fall with tenure. 4 Of course, a sufficiently high rate of productivity growth will cause the selfenforcing wage to rise, although at a lower rate than productivity.
By offering a wage guarantee at the time the worker is hired, the employer in effect promises to limit the amount of rents that he will attempt to extract in the future. Because the employer's future attempts to extract rents lead to quits that are not jointly optimal, it will generally be efficient to offer a positive wage guarantee. Of course, although a higher wage guarantee has the advantage of reducing quits, it also induces dismissals when there is a negative value of marginal product shock v t . As discussed by Black and Loewenstein, the optimal wage guarantee just balances these two competing considerations.
In our current multiperiod setting, it might be most natural that the wage commitment take the form of a promise never to cut the wage of any retained worker in the future, so that the guaranteed wage in period t simply equals the wage offer in the previous period, or ω t = w t-1 . Besides being intuitively plausible, this form of the wage guarantee can be justified on efficiency grounds because the resulting contract is easy to implement and prevents the employer from making low future wage offers that induce inefficient turnover. From our discussion above, we know that this constraint will be binding when training and productivity growth are relatively low. Given diminishing returns to training (i.e., ψ'' < 0), the wage guarantee will generally be binding once a worker's tenure becomes sufficiently high. 4 The observant reader may note the presence of an additional effect: a worker with a higher ε is more valuable to the employer because he has a lower quit rate (in equation (12), this effect works
tends to rise over time). This effect in and of itself would cause the self-enforcing wage to increase, but is generally dominated by the effect from the falling η t . For example, when f(y) and g(ε) are normal densities and β is not extremely close to 1, one can show using numerical methods that the self-enforcing wage will fall with tenure if there is no productivity growth over time.
We might also note that there are other possible justifications of a wage guarantee besides its potential use as a means of preventing employers from extracting excessive rents from workers. In accordance with the suggestion by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the efficiency wage literature, the guaranteed wage may be the lowest wage that the employer can offer and still deter workers from shirking. Alternatively, the constraint may perhaps be justified as representing a "social norm" that the employer must adhere to if he does not want to hurt the morale of his workers. In
any case, what is crucial for our current analysis is not the exact nature and level of the wage guarantee, but simply the fact that a wage guarantee exists and may be binding. We have thus chosen to simplify the ensuing discussion by taking the actual wage guarantee as being determined exogenously to our model. 5
The Division of the Returns to Training
The division of the returns to training depends crucially on whether or not the wage guarantee is binding. To see this, let us determine the effect that a change in the amount of training received by the worker in periods 0 through t-1 has on the employer's wage offer in period t. When the wage guarantee is not binding in period t, µ t = 0, so that differentiation of (8) using (1), (6), and (11) yields
When training is purely specific, α = 0 and equations (15) and (16) reduce to
Thus, in periods where the wage guarantee is not binding, the employer shares part, but not all, of the returns to the past investments in specific training with the worker. Naturally, this implies that the worker will share the cost of the training investment in the form of a lower wage at the time of the investment.
In contrast, when α = 1, (15) and (16) reduce to ∂π t /∂T t = 0 and ∂w t /∂T t = ψ'(T t ), which is the standard result that the worker receives all the returns to past investments in general training.
Because a general training investment in period τ does not raise the employer's future profits, the employer will not be willing to incur any of the costs of general training. Thus, training will occur only if the worker bears the full cost of training, either directly or indirectly in the form of a lower wage.
The result that the worker realizes all the returns and incurs the entire cost of general training depends crucially on the assumption that the employer's promised wage guarantee (10) is never binding. To see this, note that if the wage guarantee is binding at time t, then the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µ t is positive and w t = ω t . Differentiation of (11) then yields
That is, if the employer's wage guarantee is binding in period t, then a marginal increase in T t has no effect on the employer's wage period t wage offer. This result should not be surprising. If the wage guarantee is binding in period t, then the employer is constrained to offer a wage above the self-enforcing level. Since the employer is paying a wage higher than he would like, a marginal increase in T t has no effect on his wage offer.
To find the effect of an increase in T t on the employer's expected profit when the wage guarantee is binding, we need merely differentiate (8) to obtain:
When training is completely general, (17c) reduces to ∂π ∂ t t T / = µ t > 0. Thus, if the wage guarantee is binding, even purely general training will lead to an increase in the employer's profit.
To understand this result, note that if the employer were to increase the worker's period t wage by the increase in his general productivity, ψ' ( ) T t , then the worker's quit rate and the gap between the worker's net marginal product and his wage (P t -c t T t -w t ) would both be unchanged, which implies that the employer's period t profit, π t , would be unchanged. But from (17a), we know that the employer's optimal course of action is to keep the wage unchanged. It thus follows immediately that a higher T t must lead to an increase in the employer's profit. Since the employer realizes some of the returns to even purely general training, he is willing to pay some of the costs. 6 The worker, on the other hand, is less willing to pay for training.
III. Training Information in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
The model in the preceding section suggests that given real world contracting restrictions one
should not be surprised to see employers sharing the costs and returns to general as well as specific training investments. Is there any evidence of this? Recent data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) can help us to answer this question. 7 Unlike other data sets, these data have information on who bears the explicit costs of training.
Each year the NLSY obtains information on an individual's wage and tenure in his current or most recent job and on the training that he received since the last interview. We utilize data from the 1988 through 1991 NLSY surveys because these data contain information on who paid for training. Another advantage of these data is that they contain information on all training spells regardless of their duration. 7 The NLSY is a survey of 12686 individuals who were aged 14 to 22 in 1979. These youths have been interviewed annually since 1979, and the response rate has been 90 percent or higher in each year. The sample size was reduced to 11607 in 1985 when interviewing of the full military sample ceased. In 1991, the sample was further reduced to 9964 persons when the economically disadvantaged white supplemental sample was eliminated. The survey's wealth of information on individuals' demographic characteristics and ability offers a great advantage for studying the acquisition of and the returns to training. 8 There were no training questions in the 1987 survey and the questions about who paid for training were not asked in 1979 , 1980 , 1981 , 1985 , nor 1986 . Prior to 1988 12.32 percent of individuals report training in a given year, the cell sizes for some of our training components are somewhat small. However, in light of our interest in the distinct effects of specific and general training, it is not entirely clear a-priori exactly how we should group the various components. Rather than attempt to aggregate the data, we have therefore decided to stick with our five training components (and the resultant small cell sizes). 10 We should note that the NLSY interviewers manual states that "Business school" (in question #2) is "not to be confused with business classes in college or graduate school. It does not contribute to an undergraduate or professional degree." [Emphasis in the original] Questions about formal schooling are asked in another part of the survey and are not explicitly part of the training data collected in the NLSY. Vocational rehabilitation is defined as a "facility offering specialized training to prepare disabled persons to enter or re-enter the work force." We should also note that there is some uncertainty as to how individuals with informal training answer the NLSY training questions, but one suspects that the survey will generally not pick up informal training. 11 Our sample restrictions appear to have a minimal impact on the incidence of training and its distribution by type. In the full sample of 12686 individuals, the average annual incidence of training over the period 1988-1991 is 12.21 percent. Of those individuals in the full sample that report training in the past year, 19.64 percent report the aggregate category of business school (etc.), 40.89 percent report formal company training, 20.33 percent report seminars at work, 21.30 percent report seminars outside of work, and 7.38 percent report the aggregate category of vocational rehabilitation or other. The incidences of the components sum to more than 100 percent because some individuals had more than one type of training in a given year.
IV. Employer Cost Sharing and Rent Extraction -Empirical Evidence
From the responses to question #3 in Table 1 , it is straightforward to ascertain the proportion of training spells that are employer paid. This is indeed the case. Still, it is somewhat surprising that over 80% of these spells are employer paid.
Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that over 40% of all training spells in the business and vocational school category are employer financed. 12 Since this training is almost surely general, this observation does not seem consistent with the standard human capital model prediction that workers should pay for all the costs to general training investments. 13 In contrast, our model in the 12 46% of the spells in this aggregate category are at a vocational or technical institute, 20% are correspondence courses, 17% are business school spells, and 17% are apprenticeship spells. Employers pay for 30% of vocational institute spells, 57% of correspondence courses, 37% of business school spells, and 67% of apprenticeship spells. 13 In light of our relatively small cell sizes, the reader may object that the phenomenon of employer-financed general training is not really very important. However, as noted above, the NLSY training questions miss most informal training and intentionally exclude school training. School training is the labor economist's prototypical example of general training. However, analyzing the January 1991 Current Population Survey training supplement, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1993) report that of the 13.6% of workers who received school training after starting employment at their current job, 56% had at least some of their educational costs paid for by the employer. Sixty percent of these individuals had all their educational costs paid for by the employer and twenty percent had less than all but more than half their educational costs paid for by the employer. Similarly, Altonji and Spletzer (1991) report that 9.4 percent of all workers in the 1986 follow-up to the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 received employer provided financial assistance to attend school after work.
previous section suggests that contracting rigidities make it possible for employers to obtain some of the returns to general training investments, which in turn means that they are willing to incur some of the costs.
We can use wage regressions to analyze whether employers are able to obtain some of the returns to general training. The regression equation in column 1 of Table 3 has a worker's log wage as its dependent variable. As independent variables in the equation, we have included variables indicating whether the worker has received each of the different types of training in the current year, whether or not this training is employer financed, and whether or not this training is completed. Also included are variables indicating whether the worker has received training in previous years from the current employer and whether the worker has received training in previous years from a previous employer.
In addition to the various training variables, the regression contains individual and job characteristics in order to control for the heterogeneity that may exist between those who receive training and those who do not. Individual characteristics include not only the worker's age, sex, race, education, job tenure, and labor market experience, but also his score on the armed forces qualifying test (which serves an indicator of the worker's ability). Job characteristics include industry and occupation, whether the worker is in a union, whether the worker's job is part-time, the size of the employer's establishment, and whether the employer has more than one establishment.
As expected, the wage regression in column 1 of Table 3 indicates that there is a positive wage return to completed spells of employer financed training. Nearly all the coefficients on completed spells of employer financed training are positive and quite a few of these coefficients are significantly different from zero. In contrast to employer financed training, completed spells of most types of non-employer financed training [not reported in the table] do not yield a positive wage return. One possible explanation for this is that individual workers are not particularly adept on their own in choosing training activities that have a high positive return. Another possible explanation is that individuals answering the survey may be misreporting some primarily self-financed leisure time activities as training. At any rate, the rest of our discussion will focus on employer financed training, which is more germane given our current concerns. 14 As discussed above, the NLSY data indicate that besides nearly always bearing the explicit costs of specific training, employers also frequently incur the explicit costs of what appears to be general training. The question that naturally arises is whether these costs are partially passed on to workers in the form of lower wages during the training period. Interestingly, the wage regression in column 1 of Table 3 Employers should only be willing to pay the costs of training if they are able to realize some of the returns. Is there any evidence to suggest that employers extract any of the returns to general training? While the costs of a training spell occur contemporaneously, the returns occur in the future. To determine the worker's return to training, we thus look at the effect of completed spells of past training on the current wage. While we do not have a direct measure of the employer's return, we can make some inferences about employers' rent extraction by comparing the wage return to training when a worker remains at the employer providing the training with the return when he moves to a new employer.
When one examines the returns to employer financed training, one sees that the coefficient on previous spells of formal company training at the current employer is .0654, but the coefficient on previous spells of formal company training at a previous employer is only .0087. Thus, while a spell of employer financed formal company training in a previous year has a positive and significant effect on a worker's current wage if the worker obtained the training at his current employer, it has essentially no effect on his wage if it was obtained at a previous employer. This is consistent with our hypothesis that formal company training is primarily specific. By way of contrast, the coefficient on business or vocational school training at a previous employer is .1410
and significantly different from zero, which is consistent with the fact that a substantial component of this training is likely to be general. Similarly, the statistically significant positive coefficients on outside and inside seminars at a previous employer (the coefficients are .2599, and .0802, respectively) suggest that a substantial part of this training is general as well.
Unlike business and vocational school training at a previous employer, previous employer financed training in business and vocational schools at the current employer does not appear to starting wage may be somewhat sensitive to the exact specification of the starting wage equation, but if it is negative, it is certainly very small. Barron, Black, and Loewenstein suggest that their inability to obtain compensating differentials may stem in part from unmeasured differences in worker ability. This is less of a problem in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which contains richer individual data. Using the NLSY data through 1983, Lynch (1992) also fails to obtain a significant negative effect of uncompleted training on the wage. And using NLSY data from 1979 to 1982, Parsons (1989) does not find any evidence of a compensating differential for jobs with greater learning opportunities.
have a positive effect on the current wage (the coefficient is an insignificant -.0673). A similar result holds for outside and, to a lesser extent, inside seminars: while previous employer financed outside seminars at the current employer have a significantly positive effect on the current log wage, the returns (.1463) are smaller than those associated with employer financed outside seminars while at a previous employer. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that employers extract some of the return to general training.
The coefficients in column 1 of table 3 indicate that the differential return between employer financed formal company training at a previous and current employer is -.057, which is statistically different from zero at the 10% confidence level. For inside and outside seminars, the differential returns are .049 and .114, respectively. And the differential return for business and vocational school is .208, which is statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level. These estimated differential returns are listed in table 4. As one would expect, the difference between the return to training at a previous and current employer is smaller the more specific is the training.
However, it is difficult for the conventional model to explain the large positive differential for general training. Indeed, the only convincing explanation we can find is that employers are extracting some of the returns to general training.
At first glance, one might suspect that the estimated positive differential for general training might be due to a bias introduced by individuals' endogenous separation decisions. It is indeed true that the returns to previous training at previous employers are estimated from the sample of individuals who switch jobs. Because persons switch jobs when they find an alternative that is more attractive than their previous job, our estimated returns to training in previous jobs may overstate the return that a worker who does not switch jobs can expect. However, we should expect a similar bias in the estimated returns to previous training at the current employer because these returns are estimated from the sample of individuals who do not switch jobs and these individuals will on average be in an unusually good job match. In short, our estimated returns to previous training at the current employer and previous training at past employers are both confounded by individuals' endogenous separation decisions, but there is no reason a priori to expect the estimated differential to be biased in any particular direction.
As initially pointed out by Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) , individuals who are more able may be more likely to receive training. While our regression equation includes a host of individual and job characteristics in an attempt to control for heterogeneity that may exist between those who receive training and those who do not, it is still possible that the training coefficients may be biased upward because of unmeasured heterogeneity. Although it is difficult to imagine how this would bias the differential return between training at a current and previous employer, we can provide an additional check on our results by estimating a fixed effects wage equation.
While a fixed effects wage equation will obviously eliminate any bias introduced by unobserved personal characteristics, it is not so apparent how a fixed effects equation controls for unobserved match characteristics. To help get a handle on this, consider the simple error components model:
where W ijt is individual i's wage on job j at time t, T ijt is individual i's training during the current period t, T ijt is individual i's accumulated training on the current job j at the beginning of period t, T ijt is individual i's training accumulated at jobs previous to job j, u i is an individual fixed effect, v ij is an individual-job match fixed effect, and e ijt is a transitory mean zero error term uncorrelated with (T ijt ,T ijt , T ijt ,u i ,v ij ). Barron, Black, and Loewenstein worried about the unobserved individual heterogeneity u i and its correlation with the training variables (T ijt ,T ijt , T ijt ). Our further concern is the unobserved job match heterogeneity v ij and its possible correlation with the training variables.
First differencing the wage equation (18) gives us after several steps of algebra
if the individual is in same job j during periods t and t-1,
if the individual is in job j during period t and job k≠j during period t-1.
For individuals who do not change jobs, T ijt and T ijt-1 are uncorrelated with the error (e ijt -e ijt-1 ) and the estimated coefficients β 1 and β 2 are unbiased. The coefficient β 3 is not estimated from this sample of non-movers. Wage growth for individuals who change jobs can occur in three ways.
First, wages can increase the "conventional" way through contemporaneous human capital accumulation as seen by the term T ijt β 1 + T ikt-1 (β 2 -β 1 ). Second, the term T ikt (β 3 -β 2 ) indicates how wages can increase or decrease depending on how the returns on the stock of human capital acquired at the previous employer may differ at the new employer and the previous employer. (19) 16 Our discussion focuses on quits rather than dismissals in part because the former seem to be more common (for example, as reported by McLaughlin (1990) , PSID data for the period 1976-1984 indicate that quits occur 1.88 times more often than dismissals). A dismissal is caused by a negative productivity shock and is not affected by a worker's alternative wage. Thus, for workers who are dismissed, E[T ikt (v ij -v ik )] = -E(T ikt v ik ). Dismissals will therefore cause the fixed effects estimate of (β 3 -β 2 ) to be biased downward if the stock of training is positively correlated with the individual-job match fixed effect v ik .
will be biased upward from its true negative value if β 2 > β 3 and will be biased downward from its true positive value if β 2 < β 3 . We have argued that employers pay for general training because they are able to obtain some of the returns. This hypothesis is supported by our wage regressions which indicate that completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger effect on the wage than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer. Given the small cell sizes of our five training components, the evidence is not entirely conclusive. Although we could have reduced the variances of our parameter estimates by aggregating the data, we were unsure of the appropriate way to aggregate. We chose to work with the disaggregated training components in order to minimize possible differences in specificity within a given category of training. 18 Worker mobility costs are an important feature of the theoretical model that we presented in Section II. As suggested by Bishop (1988) and Parsons (1990) , a liquidity constraint facing workers is another factor that may affect the division of the returns and costs to training.
However, we may note that mobility costs and a high worker discount rate are not sufficient to induce employers to incur any of the costs of general training. Employers will be willing to incur some of the costs of general training only if they realize some of the returns. But in the absence of a binding wage guarantee, the first-order condition for the employer's post-training wage offer already takes mobility costs and discount factors into account and thus implies that all the returns 18 General training spells are likely both to have a higher wage return than specific training spells and to be associated with higher subsequent turnover. Thus, including specific and general training spells in the same training category could by itself cause us to estimate a higher wage return for training received at a previous employer than for training received at a curent employer. For this reason, we have attempted to ensure that our general training categories really include only general training. (For example, it is hard to imagine how business school training could possibly be specific).
to general human capital will be passed on to workers in the form of higher future wages. This result is quite robust and holds in both the full commitment and the self-enforcing model. The prediction that employers pay for all general training is also not affected by tax considerations. If employers are better able than workers to write off the costs of general training investments, then
we should see employers bearing the explicit costs of training and passing these costs entirely onto workers in the form of lower wages during the training period; workers should still receive all the returns to general training. However, as is the case with other data sets, there is no evidence in the NLSY that workers bear the costs of training in the form of a lower wage. 19 One can obtain the prediction that employers share in the returns and costs to general training investments only by expanding on the set of contracts that employers are allowed to offer. 20 Two contracting assumptions are common in the literature. At one extreme, it is often assumed that an employer can credibly commit to any future wage profile and at the other extreme, it is sometimes assumed that an employer must offer a contract that he will not have an incentive to alter after the employment relationship has begun. We find it more reasonable to assume that at the time of hire the employer guarantees some minimal future wage (or rate of wage growth), but is free to offer a higher wage if he so desires. The future wage guarantee serves the purpose of assuring a newly hired worker that the employer will not extract excessive rents from him should it turn out that he places a relatively high valuation on the employer's job. When the wage guarantee is binding, an increase in the worker's productivity caused by an increase in his stock of human capital will not cause the employer to pay a higher wage. The employer will thus share in the returns to general as well as specific training. 19 In the self-enforcing model, the result that workers realize all the returns to general training is also not affected by a legal minimum wage during the training period. In any case, most of the workers in our sample earn a starting wage that exceeds the legal minimum wage. 20 Katz and Ziderman (1990) argue that an employer can realize some of the return to a general training investment if competing firms have imperfect information about generality of this investment and Pichler (1993) points out that a worker will stay with a firm paying a wage below his alternative if the prospect of future wage growth from continued general training outweighs the short-run gain from quitting.
Our analysis implicitly assumes that the wage guarantee is set before training is determined. If training is entirely determined before the wage guarantee is set, then this information will be incorporated in the optimal wage guarantee; as discussed above, this would likely result in workers realizing all the returns to general training. The justification for our assumption that training is not known with certainty before the wage guarantee is set is that the returns and costs to training investments vary among workers. If information about the returns and costs to training a worker comes out belatedly over time, some training decisions will likely be postponed until after the match has started. As we discuss in a recent paper (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1995) ), this hypothesis is supported by the NLSY data. Analysis of the data indicates that a substantial amount of training is belated.
Besides its potential use as a means of preventing employers from extracting excessive rents from workers, there are other possible reasons for a future wage guarantee. In accordance with the efficiency wage literature, a wage guarantee might arise from employers' efforts to deter shirking by workers. Alternatively, the constraint may reflect a "social norm" that the employer must adhere to if he does not want to hurt the morale of his workers. No matter what its cause, a binding wage guarantee breaks the link between a worker's future productivity and wage rate, which in turn implies that employers will extract some of the returns to general training. 
